Introduction
Is the Randomized Double Blind Placebo Controlled Trial (RDBPCT,
or RCT) an objective scientific instrument? The short answer is
“yes.” A useful answer is more complicated.
Basically, the answer to this question is in fact an unqualified
“yes.” And, so there is no mistake, let me specify that
by ‘objective’ I intend to suggest that the observations
recorded in the blinded trial reflect actual facts – that
is, events or objects (trial outcomes) – and that the facts
so reflected are accurately recorded. That is what the
RCT does: it is like a camera. It records what you put in front
of it.
In fact, the RCT is certainly superior to the camera in its perfect,
or nearly perfect performance, but it is not without problems. In
any case, problems with the RCT are similar enough to problems with
the camera, to make the analogy illustrative: the camera can record
what you put before it, but someone has to pose the subject (in
research, we use the trial protocol) and someone has to develop
the film (even in a digital camera, the ability of the image to
represent the real object is dependent on the digital media: how
many megapixels, to reference only the most obvious variable). The
best camera in the world will produce only useless images, if the
subject is posed poorly, or the film developed (interpreted) by
a fool. Posing the subject, in research is represented
by the necessity of designing the experimental protocol.
And for “development of the film” we use a second, usually
unremarked level of observation, namely, selection and interpretation
of outcome data – this fact seems to be especially difficult
to see, for the research scientist, who appears to operate on the
assumption that numbers speak for themselves. Although he will agree
that this is not true, examination of the way in which statistical
results of trials are presented, of the conclusions that are drawn
from those numbers, reflects that the ability to examine one’s
own assumptions, or even recognize one is making them, is often
difficult of realization.
Both processes, of posing and developing (designing and interpreting)
are, further, dependent on selection of an appropriate object in
the first place: if we want to photograph a radio signal, with a
standard optical camera – film or digital – we will
fail. And if we want to photograph a rapidly moving object, the
wrong camera will provide only a blur. Thus, we conclude –
or will conclude – that the quality of observations
made by the RCT will be at least partly dependent on its suitability
for measuring the observations placed before it – specifically,
in other words, in this paper we will be concerned whether the RCT
is an appropriate instrument for measuring processes in homeopathic
medicine.
I propose in the following to analyze each of the major elements
of the RCT: randomization, blinding, and the placebo control. The
greater part of this analysis will focus on the blinding process,
and the key question, “are trial outcomes – which we
acknowledge to be accurately recorded – representative of
events in the real world, or do they reflect spurious products of
inadequately realized experimental replicas of real-world processes?
In short, the problem posed for the present essay is not, strictly,
whether the RCT format objectively records trial outcomes,
but whether the trial itself, the individual realization of the
idealized RCT format, has been adequately calibrated to the object
of study. A camera (RCT) that photographs an object through a fog,
will appear to produce an image of the original object, but a more
useful statement would be that it produced an image of the original
object as obscured or altered by the intervening atmospheric disturbance.
Randomization will be dealt with briefly in this paper: for the
most part, it will be shown that randomization introduces only a
few limitations to the utility of the RCT in scientific investigation.
The placebo control, on the other hand, is reviewed in somewhat
more detail, as its appropriateness to measuring medical efficacy
is more central to the issue at hand, the differing models of action
as between conventional and homeopathic medicine. Further, the effects
introduced into poorly designed studies are more problematic and
much more surprising than hitherto suspected, and deserve close
attention.
It will come as no surprise to anyone even vaguely familiar with
the history of discovery in science, that, by definition of course,
“discovery” (new knowledge) implies that earlier beliefs
have been supplanted, or in currently popular terminology, ‘falsified.’
It is time, in short, to recognize that utilization of the RCT in
scientific experimentation is not the mindlessly simple procedure
that the rabid skeptic likes to maintain: although the instrument
itself is easy to use, selection of appropriate objects for study
is more difficult than appears on superficial examination …
and, the ideal that the controlled trial is well matched to studying
homeopathy, itself deserves to be closely examined.
The Randomized Double Blind Placebo Controlled Trial
When historians look back, the last two to three decades will be
considered part of the "prehistory" of research into homeopathic
medicine. From the vantage point of the future, the work done in
this period will be understood as having been deeply flawed, in
applying a research model derived from one method of practice, without
modification, to a distinctly different practice and theoretical
model. In our particular situation, we will see that trial designs
useful for representing conventional medicine to the observing eye
of the RCT are not as well suited to representing the mechanisms
and dynamics of the healing process in homeopathic medicine. The
problems thus introduced lead to systematic repetition of errors
in measuring homeopathic efficacy.
It is often argued that the primary distinction, between homeopathic
and conventional medicine, is that conventional medicine treats
discrete disease entities, while homeopathy treats the "totality,"
the symptom picture of the whole person. But this seems to me to
miss the point, at least from the research point of view, as "totality"
from this angle is really nothing more than a "better diagnosis."
But, whether we are talking about a discrete syndrome or “the
totality,” from the research point of view the question is
the same: is homeopathy superior to placebo, or not? Were this the
only question, there would be no reason research protocols, designed
for testing conventional medicines, could not be applied, without
modification, to successful trials of homeopathic remedies.
But the essential question involves this fact, that conventional
medications aim primarily to eliminate symptoms, while homeopathic
remedies aim primarily to produce them. I confess, it is difficult
for me to understand how educated people, on both sides of the controversy,
can so consistently miss, or disregard, the implications of such
a basic element of practice. To place the issue in more common parlance,
dealing with homeopathy is like using the double negative in speech:
understanding what is being said, or what is happening in the treatment
situation, is not so obvious as might be expected.
In any case, through the methodological confusion introduced by
this omission, current research – albeit, in spite of itself
– has thus contributed to our understanding that the instrumentation
of the double blind is an idealized model of a process, an archetypal
instrument, but one that nevertheless must be well adapted, or fit,
to the specific object of investigation, or discarded in favor of
other instruments, and at the very least handled with care, that
is, paying due attention to couching findings in suitably tentative
language. By way of analogy – that is, to illuminate, but
not to prove nor to demonstrate – the "dish" may
be a basic element in design of astronomical observational equipment,
but an optical dish, a mirror, no matter how perfectly manufactured
nor how precise its observations, will never succeed in producing
evidence of radio emissions from deep space. But that does not justify
us in concluding, that there are no radio sources in deep space.
It is true, of course, that the process of blinding protects against
observer bias, regardless the object being observed, and it is this
fact that lies behind the typical skeptic attitude that it is ‘easy’
to design a trial of homeopathy, or anything else, on the assumption
that it does not matter how a trial’s outcomes are produced
(e.g., by conventional medical treatment or by homeopathy), since
the double blind mechanism works the same in either case. What skeptics
miss – universally, it seems – is this: a guarantee
that the observation of trial outcomes is objective or accurate,
does not guarantee that the outcomes themselves accurately represent
processes, or outcomes, in the real world. In other words,
if or to the degree the experimental design distorts the character
of the process it seeks to test, then the results it produces will
not accurately reflect that process; and the ability of blinded
observation to accurately record test results will likewise, in
that case, contribute little or possibly nothing to an understanding
of the real process observed in the real world.
Researchers should incorporate into their theoretical schemas,
the idea that blinded observation can and will produce an objective
and accurate record of experimental outcomes – that is in
its nature, that is what it does – but that the correlation
of those outcomes to real world processes must be achieved through
the experimental setup itself, essentially, the protocol. But the
latter has no intrinsic merits, as does the mechanism of the double
blind; rather, the protocol has to be designed from scratch, for
each new effort to measure this or that subject of experimental
investigations. Designing the protocol represents, in essence, the
act of calibrating the idealized RCT to the characteristic features
of the medical practices being examined.
A common mistake among those not familiar with research technology,
is to object that animals and very young children, who by their
natures can not ‘report’ how they feel, will nevertheless
show improvement after homeopathic treatment. The uninitiated concludes,
therefore, that there can have been no placebo effect in the healthful
response of the patient to the homeopathic remedy. But, to permit
those novices to appreciate the present essay more adequately, it
should be observed that the biased observation, which is excluded
by the double blind methodology, includes the observations and
opinions of the parent, pet owner, or physician. In short,
we don’t need the infant or the pet to say, “Gee, Ars
Alb really helped me feel better.” The proud papa or mama
does fine by himself, in introducing bias into the proceedings!
In any case, the double blind is a formal template or instrument
that may be used for many purposes, and it will accurately measure
whatever you give it to measure. But the experiment itself, the
trial, or the protocol, is the creation of the individual researcher
or research team. Its quality is completely dependent on the ability
of the research team to understand the real situation, and to design
an experiment that fairly represents the actual nature of the process
or object under investigation. If they can’t do that,
then the double-blinded trial will do nothing more than accurately
record the mistakes and misrepresentations of the experimental protocol:
If you put two flashlights – one with a light bulb in it,
and the other without – in a black box, and ask observers
to tell when one or the other flashlight has been turned on, the
randomized, double blind trial will tell you that the verum flashlight
performed no better than the placebo flashlight.
We may note, without objection, that this is an accurate reading
of the outcomes of the trial. But, of course, these outcomes
do not reflect how the two flashlights really performed, for their
actual performance occurred within the black box and was not directly
observed.
All that is observed by the double-blinded trial format,
are the outcomes produced, or permitted, by the experimental design.
If the trial design is bad, the outcomes will have no bearing on
the real world, and the accuracy of the blinded observations will
have no more relationship to reality than does the illusion of the
magician pulling a rabbit out of his hat: we’ve all seen that
trick, too. Further, an object of experimentation may be inappropriate
for a blinded trial in the first place – in the manner of
a radio source to an optical telescope; in that situation, though
the blinding process itself may produce a perfectly objective record
of trial outcomes, that record will nevertheless be useless.
In short, we will have reached the boundary at which suitability
of the RCT to particular objects, including specific medical practices,
has been crossed. The proposition that the RCT can be applied with
ease to the study of homeopathy will have been falsified.
The RCT and Homeopathy: Elimination vs. Production of Symptoms
The Randomized Double Blind Placebo Controlled Trial, as the child
of recent developments in statistical science, cut its admittedly
remarkable teeth on the efficacy trial of conventional (or "allopathic")
medication. To take a simplified, or "idealized" model
of the challenge faced in such an efficacy trial, we may conceptualize
the action of conventional medications as directed toward a discrete
symptom, for example, aspirin to pain.
Certainly, there are fine and even significant points of differentiation,
as between one pain medication and another; furthermore, there are
medications that are directed toward a broader range of pathology
than can be specified by a single symptom; and certainly there are
“allopathic” medications that aim to do more than merely
suppress symptoms. But the essential purpose of the efficacy trial
is unchanged by this, and that is to measure whether the medication
has an effect in eliminating a symptom. Indeed, in this regard,
the efficacy trial is indistinguishable from the treatment trial,
and may in fact be considered a focused variation on the treatment
trial.
By contrast, the "efficacy" trial in homeopathy, more
accurately called a "proving trial," has its purpose to
demonstrate whether the remedy in question can produce
symptoms, not eliminate them. Further, a glance at the
materia medica reveals that even the least productive remedies are
capable of provoking numerous symptoms in the patient, or prover,
while the "largest" remedies may produce many hundreds
of symptoms. In an earlier paper on this subject,1 I pointed to
the example of Belladonna, regarding which Hahnemann lists, in the
Materia Medica Pura, 1,440 symptoms.
Immediately, we see that the efficacy trial of "aspirin"
needs only to look in one place, to see whether the medication is
working. By contrast, to document "effect" of the homeopathic
remedy, research must have the ability to identify the complete
spectrum of a remedy's action, that is, to identify participant
response as verum symptom, regardless which of the 1,440 symptoms
he produces. This point of view may be challenged, of course, for
example, by the view that a remedy may be tested against a selection
of proving symptoms, on the assumption that verum should still outperform
placebo, proportionately, within this more limited field, an assumption
that lays behind the model used in the Belladonna proving trial
discussed in an earlier paper.
Nevertheless, designing a trial protocol on this basis introduces
an added burden to the research team, of justifying their hypothesis,
that it is fair to extrapolate results produced through such a design,
to an evaluation of performance of the remedy across the full range
of its action. Some of the problems with this assumption were addressed
in my aforementioned paper;1 I will now proceed to a further consideration
of this interesting subject.
The RCT and Homeopathy: Placebo and Placebo Response.
With regard to this problem, for our present purposes, I would
stipulate in particular:
first, that individual response to a remedy, by trial participants,
is by definition selective, and, therefore, that there is no way
to align a pre-selected symptom list with the actual symptoms
that may be produced by the variety of participants in the trial
- in short, in this model, the verum group may produce a full
range of symptoms, but is given credit for only a part;
and, second, and also by definition, since placebo response
reflects the human capacity for suggestibility, the common research
strategy, of providing a list of symptoms to a trial group, has
the effect that those inclined to placebo response will naturally
produce precisely those symptoms that have been placed in front
of them! In essence, then, the control group is set up to
respond to the entire range of symptoms expected of it –
as reflected in the list of symptoms provided – in contrast
to the fact that only selected symptoms are counted for the experimental
group.
By these transactions, placebo response is actually statistically
enhanced, at the expense of verum. The researcher might as well
say, "Here, this is what we want you to produce." Of course,
the trial participant in the control group, who is suggestible,
responds behaviorally with, "Sure, glad to oblige," while
the participant in the verum group can only shrug his shoulders
and wait to see if there is a (real) reaction.
In brief, to repeat, this outcome rests on the tendency of
placebo to model itself after symptoms that are the target of treatment,
or intervention. But this is one of numerous characteristics
of placebo response (distinguished from the ‘sugar
pill’ per se) that have never been addressed by research scientists:
simply stated, a patient treated for headache does not
report that his stomach feels better as a result of the
doctor's prescription. Yet if both of these represent proving symptoms
of the remedy being tested, then the verum subject is as likely
to produce one as the other … but will only be credited if
the one he produces happens to be found on the list.
It is true, as it might be argued, that some in the verum group
will also show a placebo response, thus balancing the response of
the control group. Yet, since some of those verum subjects who produce
placebo symptoms, will also produce true verum symptoms,
the latter will be lost to the final count: that is, they will fall
below the raised bar – the enhanced performance of placebo
across both groups – thus biasing trial outcome in the direction
of placebo. This dynamic, of course, is in addition to
the reduction in verum response because of the trial design –
that is, the fact that only a limited number of symptoms from the
proving record are allowed.
For clarity, this important dynamic may be thought of as an "induced
placebo response." A trial that does not
specify target symptoms ahead of time, or which has the same symptom
or symptoms as the legitimate objects of the trial for
both groups is (as in trials of conventional medications) in a better
position to approximate human response in a normal, as compared
to the test, environment. Failure to identify and evaluate effects
of such dynamics, in the testing situation, reflects the research
team’s inadequate knowledge or training, regarding the nature
of the homeopathic action, combined with the absence of any clinically
viable definition of "placebo response" itself.
In an idealized trial of conventional medications, placebo and
verum are on a level playing field: verum aims to eliminate a particular
symptom, and by its nature, placebo develops in the same direction
– aspirin and placebo both tend to eliminate headache pain,
the question of the RCT being, of course, "which does a better
job?" It is this qualitative equality of outcome – elimination
of the same symptom, as between placebo and verum response –
that makes it possible to conclude absence of bias in quantitative
findings of a conventional trial, and, more important, relevance
of those findings to medical practice in the real world.
The diversity of outcomes in proving trials of homeopathy, on
the other hand, requires theoretical and practical, clinical expertise,
to modify protocol design sufficiently to equalize outcomes, or
at least account realistically for variations, other than by stereotyped
application of terms such as "placebo." But this is a
difficult task, as I hope I have here and previously demonstrated.
In fact, it is by no means clear that we have the ability to exclude
significant confounders as potentially important factors in the
outcomes of a randomized trial.
In short, in spite of the character of the idealized double blind
trial, in eliminating bias, in fact we find, at least in this respect,
that it can actually create bias, against verum. Recalling
my observations in the first article of this series, regarding the
way in which antidoting factors may favor placebo, we now have two
examples of statistical bias, in favor of placebo, introduced
by a combination of the very nature of homeopathic action (production
of numerous symptoms); the nature of placebo response (to mimic
targeted symptoms); and inadequacies in the double blind instrument,
that is, that it is able to accurately record trial outcomes, but
is unable to differentiate the sources of trial outcomes,
leading, in the situations described above, to an undercount for
verum and an elevated count for placebo.
It is, however, unfair, or inaccurate, to be satisfied with describing
this as an “inadequacy” of the blinding principle: better
is to realize that these considerations reflect limitations
on the appropriate use of this important scientific instrument.
After all, though skeptics apparently prefer to think otherwise,
all instruments have limits. How can it be otherwise?
In summary, the statistical outcome of the blinded trial, while
objectively and accurately recording the performance of verum v
placebo in the trial, does not possess any prima facie
relationship to medical practice in the real world, and misrepresents
real medical practice to the degree to which these dynamics are
not accounted for. What I have called the "induced placebo
response," however, is only a part of the problem, which I
have highlighted in order to illustrate the subtle, unexpected,
and even ironic ways in which the supposed objectivity of a scientific
experiment can be compromised. |